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Abstract In multiagent environments, the capability of learning is important for an
agent to behave appropriately in face of unknown opponents and dynamic environ-
ment. From the system designer’s perspective, it is desirable if the agents can learn
to coordinate towards socially optimal outcomes, while also avoiding being exploited
by selfish opponents. To this end, we propose a novel gradient ascent based algorithm
(SA-IGA) which augments the basic gradient-ascent algorithm by incorporating so-
cial awareness into the policy update process. We theoretically analyze the learning
dynamics of SA-IGA using dynamical system theory and SA-IGA is shown to have
linear dynamics for a wide range of games including symmetric games. The learning
dynamics of two representative games (the prisoner’s dilemma game and the coordi-
nation game) are analyzed in details. Based on the idea of SA-IGA, we further pro-
pose a practical multiagent learning algorithm, called SA-PGA, based on Q-learning
update rule. Simulation results show that SA-PGA agent can achieve higher social
welfare than previous social-optimality oriented Conditional Joint Action Learner
(CJAL) and also is robust against individually rational opponents by reaching Nash
equilibrium solutions.
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1 Introduction
In multiagent systems, the ability of learning is important for an agent to adaptively
adjust its behaviors in response to coexisting agents and unknown environments in
order to optimize its performance. Multiagent learning algorithms have received ex-
tensive investigation in the literature, and lots of learning strategies [6,9,18,30] have
been proposed to facilitate coordination among agents.
The multi-agent learning criteria proposed in [8] require that an agent should
be able to converge to a stationary policy against some class of opponents (conver-
gence) and the best-response policy against any stationary opponent (rationality).
If both agents adopt a rational learning strategy in the context of repeated games
and also their strategies converge, then they will converge to a Nash equilibrium of
the stage game. Indeed, convergence to Nash equilibrium has been the most com-
monly accepted goal to pursue in multiagent learning literature. Until now, a number
of gradient-ascent based multiagent learning algorithms [?, 1, 8, 23, 29] have been
sequentially proposed towards converging to Nash equilibrium with improved con-
vergence performance and more relaxed assumptions (less information is required).
Under the same direction, another well-studied family of multiagent learning strate-
gies is based on reinforcement learning (e.g., Q-learning [27]). Representative exam-
ples include distributed Q-learning in cooperative games [15], minimax Q-learning
in zero-sum games [16], Nash Q-learning in general-sum games [14], and other ex-
tensions [9, 17], to name just a few.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
C D
Agent 1’s
actions
C 3/3 0/5
D 5/0 1/1
Table 1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
All the aforementioned learning strategies pursue converging to Nash equilibrium
under self-play, however, Nash equilibrium solution may be undesirable in many sce-
narios. One well-known example is the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game shown in Table
1. By converging to the Nash equilibrium (D,D), both agents obtain the payoff of
1, while they could have obtained a much higher payoff of 3 by coordinating on the
non-equilibrium outcome (C,C). In situations like the PD game, converging to the
socially optimal outcome, i.e., the maximal total reward of all players, under self-
play would be more preferred. To address this issue, one natural modification for a
gradient-ascent learner is to update its policy along the direction of maximizing the
sum of all agents’ expected payoff instead of its own. However, in an open environ-
ment, the agents are usually designed by different parties and may have not the incen-
tive to follow the strategy we design. The above way of updating strategy would be
easily exploited and taken advantage by (equilibrium-driven) self-interested agents.
Thus it would be highly desirable if an agent can converge to socially optimal out-
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comes under self-play and Nash equilibrium against self-interested agents to avoid
being exploited.
In this paper, we propose a new gradient-ascent based algorithm (SA-IGA) which
augments the basic gradient ascent algorithm by incorporating “social awareness”
into the policy update process. Social awareness means that agents try to optimize
social outcomes as well as its own outcome. A SA-IGA agent holds a social attitude
to reflect its socially-aware degree, which can be adjusted adaptively based on the
relative performance between its own and its opponent. A SA-IGA agent seeks to up-
date its policy in the direction of increasing its overall payoff which is defined as the
average of its individual and the social payoff weighted by its socially-aware degree.
We theoretically show that for a wide range of games (e.g., symmetric games), the
dynamics of SA-IGAs under self-play exhibits linear characteristics. For general-sum
games, it may exhibit non-linear dynamics which can still be analyzed numerically.
The learning dynamics of two representative games (the prisoner’s dilemma game
and the coordination game representing symmetric games and asymmetric games,
respectively) are analyzed in details. Like previous theoretical multiagent learning
algorithms, SA-IGA also requires additional assumption of knowing the opponent’s
policy and the game structure.
To relax the above assumption, we then propose a practical gradient ascent based
multiagent learning strategy, called Socially-aware Policy Gradient Ascent (SA-PGA).
SA-PGA relaxes the above assumptions by estimating the performance of its own and
the opponent using Q-learning techniques.We empirically evaluate its performance in
different types of benchmark games and simulation results show that SA-PGA agent
outperforms previous learning strategies in terms of maximizing the social welfare
and Nash product of the agents. Besides, SA-PGA is also shown to be robust against
individually rational opponents and converges to Nash equilibrium solutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 generally reviews
some related works about Gradient Ascent Reinforcement Learning algorithms. Sec-
tion 3 reviews normal-form game and the basic gradient ascent approach. Section 4
introduces the SA-IGA algorithm and analyzes its learning dynamics theoretically.
Section 5 presents the practical multiagent learning algorithm SA-PGA in details. In
Section 6, we extensively evaluate the performance of SA-PGA under various bench-
mark games. Lastly we conclude the paper and point out future directions in Section
7.
2 Related Works
The first gradient ascent multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm is Infinitesimal
Gradient Ascent (IGA [23]), in which each learner updates its policy towards the
gradient direction of its expected payoff. The purpose of IGA is to promote agents
to converge to a particular Nash Equilibrium in a two-player two-action normal-form
game. IGA has been proved that agents will converge to Nash equilibrium or if the
strategies themselves do not converge, then their average payoffs will nevertheless
converge to the average payoffs of Nash equilibrium. Soon after, M. Zinkevich et al.
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[31] propose an algorithm called Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent(GIGA),
which extends IGA to the game with an arbitrary number of actions.
Both IGA and GIGA can be combined with the Win or Learn Fast (WoLF)
heuristic in order to improve performance in stochastic games (Wolf-IGA [8], Wolf-
GIGA [7]). The intuition behindWoLF principle is that an agent should adapt quickly
when it performs worse than expected, whereas it should maintain the current strat-
egy when it receives payoff better than the expected one. By altering the learning rate
according to the WoLF principle, a rational algorithm can be made convergent. The
shortage of WoLF-IGA or WoLF-GIGA is that these two algorithms require a refer-
ence policy, i.e., they require the estimation of Nash equilibrium strategies and cor-
responding payoffs. To this end, Banerjee et al [4] propose an alternative criterion of
WoLF-IGA, named Policy Dynamics based WoLF(PDWoLF), that can be accurately
computed and guarantees convergence. The Weighted Policy Learner (WPL [1]) is
another variation of IGA that also modulates the learning rate, meanwhile, it does
not require a reference policy. Both of the WoLF and WPL are designed to guarantee
convergence in stochastic repeated games.
Another direction for extending IGA is making improvements from the learning
value functions. Zhang et al [29] propose a gradient-based learning algorithm by
adjusting the expected payoff function of IGA, named Gradient Ascent with Policy
PredictionAlgorithm(IGA-PP). The algorithm is designed for games with two agents.
The key idea behind this algorithm is that a player adjusts its strategy in response
to forecasted strategies of the other player, instead of its current ones. It has been
proved that, in two-player, two-action, general-sum matrix games, IGA-PP in self-
play or against IGA would lead players’ strategies to converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Like other MARL algorithms, besides the common assumption, this algorithm also
has additional requirements that a player knows the other players strategy and current
strategy gradient (or payoff matrix) so that it can forecast the other players strategy.
All the aforementioned learning strategies pursue converging to Nash equilibri-
ums. In contrast, in this work, we seek to incorporate the social awareness into GA-
based strategy update and aim at improving the social welfare of the players under
self-play rather than pursuing Nash equilibrium solutions. Meanwhile, individually
rational behavior is employed when playing against a selfish agent. Similar idea of
adaptively behaving differently against different opponentswas also employed in pre-
vious algorithms [10,12,17,19]. However, all the existing works focus onmaximizing
an agent’s individual payoff against different opponents in different types of games,
but do not directly take into consideration the goal of maximizing social welfare (e.g.,
cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma game).
3 Background
In this section we introduce the necessary background for our contribution. First,
we gave an overview of the relevant game theory definition. Then a brief review of
gradient ascent based MARL (GA-MARL) algorithm is given.
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3.1 Game theory
Game theory provides a framework for modeling agents’ interaction, which was used
by previous researchers in order to analyze the convergence properties of MARL
algorithms [1, 8, 23, 29]. A game specifies, in a compact and simple manner, how the
payoff of an agent depends on other agents actions. A (normal form) game is defined
by the tuple< N,A1, ..., AN , R1, ..., RN >, whereN is the number of players in the
game,Ai is the set of actions available to agent i, andRi : A1× ...×AN → R is the
reward (payoff) of agent i which is defined as a function of the joint action executed
by all agents. If the game has only two agents, then it is convenient to define their
reward functions as a payoff matrix as follows,
Ri = {r
jk
i }|A1|×|A2|
where i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ Aj and k ∈ Ak . Each element r
jk
i in the matrix represents the
payoff received by agent i, if agent i plays action j and its opponent plays action k.
A policy (or a strategy) of an agent i is denoted by pii : Ai → [0, 1], which
maps its actions to a probability. The probability of choosing an action k according
to policy pii is pii(k). A policy is deterministic or pure if the probability of playing
one action is 1 while the probability of playing other actions is 0, (i.e. ∃pii(k) = 1
AND ∀l 6= k, pii(l) = 0), otherwise the policy is stochastic or mixed. The joint
policy of all agents is the collection of individual agents’ policies, which is defined
as pi =< pi1, ..., piN >. For continence, the joint policy is usually expressed as pi =<
pii, pi−i >, where pi−i is the collection of all policies of agents other than agent i.
The expected payoff of an agent is defined as the reward averaged over the
joint policy. Let A−i = {< a1, ..., aN >: aj ∈ Aj ∧ i 6= j}, if agents fol-
low a joint policy pi, then the expected payoff of agent i would be, Vi (pi) =∑
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii (ai)pi−i (a−i)Ri (ai, a−i), where Ri (ai, a−i) = r
aia−i
i .
The goal of each agent is to find such a policy that maximizes the players expected
payoff. Ideally, we want all agents to reach the equilibrium that maximizes their in-
dividual payoffs. However, when agents do not communicate and/or agents are not
cooperative, reaching a globally optimal equilibrium is not always attainable. An al-
ternative goal is converging to the Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is by definition a
local maximum across agents. A joint strategy is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE),
if no player can get a better expected payoff by changing its current strategy unilater-
ally. Formally, pi∗ =
(
pi∗i , pi
∗
−i
)
is a NE, iff ∀i∀pii: Vi
(
pi∗i , pi
∗
−i
)
≥ Vi
(
pii, pi
∗
−i
)
. An
NE is pure if all its constituting policies are pure. Otherwise the NE is called mixed
or stochastic. Any game has at least one Nash equilibrium, but may not have any pure
equilibrium.
Next subsection, we introduce the Gradient Ascent based MARL algorithm (GA-
MARL), together with a brief review of the dynamic analysis of GA-MARL.
3.2 Gradient Ascent (GA) MARL Algorithms
Gradient ascent MARL algorithms (GA-MARL) learn a stochastic policy by directly
following the expected reward gradient. The ability to learn a stochastic policy is
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particularly important when the world is not fully observable or has a competitive
nature. The basic GA-MARL algorithm whose dynamics were analyzed is the In-
finitesimal Gradient Ascent(IGA [23]) . When a game is repeatedly played, an IGA
player updates its strategy towards maximizing its expected payoffs. A player i em-
ploying GA-based algorithms updates its policy towards the direction of its expected
reward gradient, as illustrated by the following equations,
∆pi
(t+1)
i ← α
∂Vi
(
pi(t)
)
∂pii
(1)
pi
(t+1)
i ← Π[0,1]
(
pi
(t)
i +∆pi
(t+1)
i
)
(2)
where parameter α is the gradient step size, and Π[0,1] is the projection function
mapping the input value to the valid probability range of [0, 1], used to prevent the
gradient moving the strategy out of the valid probability space. Formally, we have,
Π[0,1] (x) = argminz∈[0,1] |x− z| (3)
Singh, Kearns, and Mansour [23] examined the dynamics of using gradient ascent
in two-player, two-action, iterated matrix games. We can represent this problem as
two matrices,
Ri =
[
r11i r
12
i
r21i r
22
i
]
, i ∈ {1, 2}
We refer to the joint policy of the two players at time t by the probabilities of
choosing the first action (pt1, p
t
2), where pii = (p
t
i, 1− p
t
i), i ∈ {1, 2} is the policy of
player i. The t notation will be omitted when it does not affect clarity (for example,
when we are considering only one point in time). Then, for the two-player two-action
case, the above way of GA-based updating in Equations 1 and 2 can be simplified as
follows,
p
(t+1)
i ← Π[0,1]
(
p
(t)
i + α
(
uip
(t)
−i + ci
))
(4)
where ui = r
11
i + r
22
i − r
12
i − r
21
i , ci = r
12
i − r
22
i .
In the case of infinitesimal gradient step size (η → 0), the learning dynamics of
the players can be modeled as a system of differential equations, i.e. p˙i = uip−i+ ci,
i ∈ {1, 2}, which can be analyzed using dynamic system theory [11]. It is proved
that the agents will converge to a Nash equilibrium, or if the strategies themselves
do not converge, then their average payoffs will nevertheless converge to the average
payoffs of a Nash equilibrium [23].
Combined with Q-learning [26], researchers propose a practical learning algo-
rithm, i.e. the policy hill-climbing algorithm (PHC) [8], which is a simple extension
of IGA and is shown in Table 1.
The algorithm performs hill-climbing in the space of mixed policies, which is
similar to gradient ascent, but does not require as much knowledge. Q values are
maintained just as in normal Q-learning. In addition the algorithm maintains the cur-
rent mixed policy. The policy is improved by increasing the probability that it selects
the highest valued action according to a learning rate α ∈ (0, 1]. After that, the pol-
icy is mapped back to the valid probability space. This technique, like Q-learning, is
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Algorithm 1 PHC for player i
1: Lets α, β ∈ (0, 1) be learning rates.
2: Initialize,
Qi (a)← 0, pii(a)←
1
|Ai|
.
3: repeat
4: Select action a ∈ Ai according to mixed strategy pii with suitable exploration.
5: Observing reward r. Update Q,
Qi (a)← (1− β)Qi (a) + βr.
6: Update pii according to gradient ascent strategy,
pii (a)← Π[0,1][pii (a) − α], if a 6= argmax
a′∈A
Q (a′),
pii (a)← 1−
∑
a′ 6=a
pi (a′), if a = argmax
a′∈A
Q (a′).
7: until the repeated game ends
rational and will converge to an optimal policy if other players are playing stationary
strategies. The algorithm guarantees the Q values will converge to Q∗ (the local op-
timal value of Q) with a suitable exploration policy. pi will converge to a policy that
is greedy according toQ, which is converging toQ∗, and therefore will converge to a
best response. PHC is rational and has no limit on the number of agents and actions.
4 Socially-aware Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (SA-IGA)
In our daily life, people usually do not always behave as a purely individually rational
entity and seek to achieve Nash equilibrium solutions. For example, when two person
subjects play a PD game, reaching mutual cooperation may be observed frequently.
Similar phenomena have also been observed in extensive human-subject based ex-
periments in games such as the Public Goods game [13] and Ultimatum game [2], in
which human subjects are usually found to obtain much higher payoff by mutual co-
operation rather than pursuing Nash equilibrium solutions. If the above phenomenon
is transformed into computational models, it indicates that an agent may not only
update its policy in the direction of maximizing its own payoff, but also take into
consideration other’s payoff. We call this type of agents as socially-aware agents.
In this paper, we incorporate the social awareness into the gradient-ascent based
learning algorithm. In this way, apart from learning to maximizing its individual pay-
off, an agent is also equipped with the social awareness so that it can (1) reach mu-
tually cooperative solutions faced with other socially-aware agents (self-play); (2)
behave in a purely individually rational manner when others are purely rational.
Specifically, for each SA-IGA agent i, it distinguishes two types of expected pay-
offs, namely V idvi and V
soc
i . Payoffs V
idv
i (pi) and V
soc
i (pi) represent the individual
and social payoff (the average payoff of all agents) that agent i perceives under the
joint strategy pi respectively. The payoff V idvi (pi) follows the same definition as IGA
and the payoff V soci (pi) is defined as the average of the individual payoffs of all
agents.
V soci (pi) =
1
N
∑
i
V idvi (pi), (5)
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Each agent i adopts a social attitude wi ∈ [0, 1] to reflect its socially-aware de-
gree. The social attitude intuitively models an agent’s social friendliness degree to-
wards others. Specifically, it is used as the weighting factor to adjust the relative
importance between V idvi and V
soc
i , and agent i’s overall expected payoff is defined
as follows,
V (pi) = (1− wi)V
idv
i (pi) + wiV
soc
i (pi) (6)
Each agent i updates its strategy in the direction of maximizing the value of Vi.
Formally we have,
∆pii ← αpi
∂Vi (pi)
∂pii
, pii ← Π[0,1] (pii +∆pii) (7)
where parameter αpi is the gradient step size of pii. If wi = 0, it means that the agent
seeks to maximize its individual payoff only, which is reduced to the case of tradi-
tional gradient-ascent updating; if wi = 1, it means that the agent seeks to maximize
the sum of the payoffs of both players.
Finally, each agent i’s socially-aware degree is adaptively adjusted in response to
the relative value of V idvi and V
soc
i as follows. During each round, if player i’s own
expected payoff V idvi exceeds the value of V
soc
i , then player i increases its social
attitude wi, (i.e., it becomes more social-friendly because it perceives itself to be
earning more than the average). Conversely, if V idvi is less than V
soc
i , then the agent
tends to care more about its own interest by decreasing the value of wi. Formally,
wt+1i ← Π[0,1]
(
wti + αw
(
V idvi − V
soc
i
))
(8)
where parameter αw is the learning rate of wi.
4.1 Theoretical Modeling and Analysis of SA-IGA
An important aspect of understanding the behavior of a multiagent learning algo-
rithm is theoretically modeling and analyzing its underlying dynamics [6, 20, 25].
In this section, we first show that the learning dynamics of SA-IGA under self-play
can be modeled as a system of differential equations. To simplify analysis, we only
considered two-player-two-action games.
Based on the adjustment rules in Equation (7) and (8), the learning dynamics of a
SA-IGA agent can be modeled as a set of equations in (9). For ease of exposition, we
concentrate on an unconstrained update equations by removing the policy projection
function which does not affect our qualitative analytical results. Any trajectory with
linear (non-linear) characteristic without constraints is still linear (non-linear) when
a boundary is enforced.
∆pi
(t+1)
i ← αpi
∂Vi
(
pi(t)
)
∂pii
∆wt+1i ← αw(V
idv
i − V
soc
i )
pi
(t+1)
i ← pi
(t)
i +∆pi
(t+1)
i
w
(t+1)
i ← w
(t)
i +∆w
(t+1)
i
(9)
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Substituting V idvi and V
soc
i by their definitions (Equations 4 and 5), the learning
dynamics of two SA-IGA agents can be expressed as follows,
∆pt+1i = αp ·
[(
ui +
u−i − ui
2
wti
)
pt−i +
d−i − ci
2
wti + ci
]
∆wt+1i = αw ·
[
(ui − u−i) p
t
ip
t
−i + (ci − d−i) p
t
i + (c−i − di) p
t
−i + ei
] (10)
where ui = r
11
i + r
22
i − r
12
i − r
21
i , ci = r
12
i − r
22
i ,di = r
21
i − r
22
i , and ei = r
22
i − r
22
−i
with i ∈ {1, 2}.
As αpi → 0 and αw → 0, it is straightforward to show that the above equations
become differential. Thus the unconstrained dynamics of the strategy pair and social
attitudes as a function of time is modeled by the following system of differential
equations:
p˙i =
(
ui +
u−i − ui
2
wi
)
p−i +
d−i − ci
2
wi + ci
w˙i = ε · [(ui − u−i) pip−i + (ci − d−i) pi + (c−i − di) p−i + ei]
(11)
where ε = αw
αp
> 0.
Based on the above theoretical modeling, next we analyze the learning dynamics
of SA-IGA qualitatively as follows.
Theorem 1 SA-IGA has non-linear dynamics when u1 6= u2.
Proof : From differential equations in (11), it is straightforward to verify that the
dynamics of SA-IGA learners are non-linear when u1 6= u2 due to the existence of
w1p2, w2p1 and p1p2 in all equations.
Since SA-IGA’s dynamics are non-linear when u1 6= u2, in general we cannot
obtain a closed-form solution, but we can still resort to solve the equations numer-
ically to obtain useful insight of the system’s dynamics. Moreover, a wide range of
important games fall into the category of u1 = u2, in which the system of equations
become linear. Therefore, it allows us to use dynamic system theory to systematically
analyze the underlying dynamics of SA-IGA.
Theorem 2 SA-IGA has linear dynamics when the game itself is symmetric.
Proof : A two-player two-action symmetric game can be represented in Table 2 in
general. It is obvious to check that it satisfies the constraint of u1 = u2, given that
ui = r
11
i + r
22
i − r
12
i − r
21
i , i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus the theorem holds.
4.2 Dynamics Analysis of SA-IGA
Previous section mainly analyzed the dynamics of SA-IGA in a qualitative manner.
In this section, we move to provide detailed analysis of SA-IGA’s learning dynamics.
We first summarize a generalized conclusion for symmetric games, and then analysis
symmetric circumstances in two representative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
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1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
action 1 action 2
Agent 1’s
actions
action 1 a/a b/c
action 2 c/b d/d
Table 2 The General Form of a Symmetric Game
and the Symmetric Coordination game. For asymmetric circumstances, because the
complexity of nonlinear problem analysis, we only focus on the general coordination
game (Table 3). Specifically we analyze the SA-IGA’s learning dynamics of those
games by identifying the existing equilibrium points, which provides useful insights
into understanding of SA-IGA’s dynamics.
For symmetric games, we have the following conclusion,
Theorem 3 The dynamics of SA-IGA algorithm under self-play under a symmetric
game have three types of equilibrium points:
1.
{
(0, 0, w∗1 , w
∗
2)
∣∣ c−b
2 w
∗
i + b − d < 0, w
∗
i ∈ [0, 1]
}
;{
(1, 1, w∗1 , w
∗
2)
∣∣ c−b
2 w
∗
i + a− c > 0, w
∗
i ∈ [0, 1]
}
;
2. {(1, 0, 0, 1) , (0, 1, 1, 0)}, if c > b > d ∧ b+ c > 2a;
{(1, 0, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 0, 1)}, if b > c > a ∧ b+ c > 2d;
3.
{
(p∗, p∗, w∗, w∗)
∣∣p∗ = b−c2u w∗ + d−bu , p∗, w∗ ∈ [0, 1]},
where u = a + d − b − c. The first and second types of equilibrium points are
stable, while the last is not. We say an equilibrium point is stable if once the strategy
starts ”close enough” to the equilibrium (within a distance δ from it), it will remain
”close enough” to the equilibrium point forever.
Proof : Following the system of differential equations in Equations (11), we can ex-
press the dynamics of SA-IGA in Symmetric game as follows:
p˙i = up−i +
c− b
2
wi + b− d
w˙i = ε (b− c) (pi − p−i)
(12)
where ε = ηw
ηp
> 0,u = a+ d− b− c, i ∈ {1, 2}.
We start with proving the last type of equilibrium points: If there exist an equilib-
rium eq = (p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
T ∈ (0, 1)4, then we have p˙i (eq) = 0 and w˙i (eq) = 0,
i ∈ {1, 2}. By solving the above equations, we have p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
b−c
2u w
∗ + d−b
u
and
w∗ = w∗1 = w
∗
2 . Since p
∗
1, p
∗
2 ∈ (0, 1), then we have,
0 <
b− c
2u
w∗ +
d− b
u
< 1
Then eq = (p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
T
is an equilibrium. The stability of eq can be verified
using theories of non-linear dynamics [21]. By expressing the unconstrained update
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differential equations in the form of x˙ = Ax +B, we have
A =


0 u c− b 0
u 0 0 c− b
ε (b− c) ε (c− b) 0 0
ε (c− b) ε (b− c) 0 0


After calculating matrix A’s eigenvalue, then we have λ1 = 0, λ2 = u, λ3 = −
u
2 +k
and λ4 = −
u
2 − k, where k is a constant. Since there exist an eigenvalue λ > 0, the
equilibrium eq is not stable.
Next we turn to consider cases that equilibriums are in the boundary. In these
cases, we need to put the projection function back. If pi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, accord-
ing to the known conditions, we have w c−b2 w
∗
i < d − b. Combined with the un-
constrained update differential equations 12, we have limt→∞ p˙i < 0, then pi re-
mains unchanged. And because p1 = p2 = 0, then for ∀wi ∈ [0, 1], w˙i = 0, then
((0, 0, w∗1, w
∗
2)) is an equilibrium.
Becausew c−b2 w
∗
i < d−b, there exist a δ > 0, and a setU (eq, δ) =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]4 |
|x− eq| < δ}, that for ∀x ∈ U (eq, δ), limpi p˙i < 0. Thus p will stabilize on the
point of 0. Also, as limt→0 w˙i = (b− c) limt→0 (p1 − p2) = (b− c) limt→0 (0− 0) =
0, w also stable, and thus the equilibrium eq is stable.
The case that pi = 1, i ∈ {1, 2} can be proved similarly, which is omitted here.
For the case p1 = 1 ∧ p2 = 0, if ((1, 0, w
∗
1, w
∗
2)) is an equilibrium, combined
with the unconstrained update differential equations 12, we have w˙1 = −w˙2, which
means that wi will keeps changing until w1 = 1 ∧ w2 = 0 or w1 = 0 ∧ w2 = 1. If
((1, 0, 0, 1)) is an equilibrium, then p˙1 > 0 ∧ p˙2 < 0 and w˙1 < 0 ∧ w˙2 > 0. Take
into Equations 12, we get c > b > d ∧ b + c > 2a. Other case are the same, thus we
it omit here.
The stability of the second type of equilibriums can be proved by the way as the
first type one, which is omitted here.
From Theorem 3, we know that there are three types of equilibriums if both play-
ers play SA-IGA policy, while only the first and second types of equilibrium points
are stable. Besides, all equilibriums of the first two types are pure strategies, i.e., the
probability pi for selecting action 1 for agent i ∈ {1, 2} equals to 1 or 0. Notably,
the range of w (the social attitude) in these three types of equilibriums may be over-
lapped, resulting in that the final convergence of the algorithm also depends on the
value of p. Next we concentrate on details of two representative symmetric games:
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game and the Symmetric Coordination game.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is a symmetric game whose parameters meet
the conditions: c > a > d > b. Combined with Theorem 3, we have the following
conclusion,
Corollary 1 The dynamics of SA-IGA algorithm under Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game have two types of stable equilibrium points:
1. (0, 0, w∗1, w
∗
2), if w
∗
1 , w
∗
2 < min
{
2(c−a)
c−b ,
2(d−b)
c−b
}
;
2. (1, 1, w∗1, w
∗
2), if w
∗
1 , w
∗
2 > max
{
2(c−a)
c−b ,
2(d−b)
c−b
}
;
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Proof : Because the PD game is a symmetric game, we can use conclusions of The-
orem 3 directly. From Theorem 3, we can see that the PD game have two types of
stable equilibrium points:
1.
{
(0, 0, w∗1 , w
∗
2)
∣∣ c−b
2 w
∗
i + b − d < 0, w
∗
i ∈ [0, 1]
}
;{
(1, 1, w∗1 , w
∗
2)
∣∣ c−b
2 w
∗
i + a− c > 0, w
∗
i ∈ [0, 1]
}
;
2. {(1, 0, 0, 1) , (0, 1, 1, 0)}, if c > b > d ∧ b+ c > 2a;
{(1, 0, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 0, 1)}, if b > c > a ∧ b+ c > 2d;
For the first type of equilibrium, take c > a > d > b into conditions in above
formulas, we have: if w∗1 , w
∗
2 < min
{
2(c−a)
c−b ,
2(d−b)
c−b
}
, then (0, 0, w∗1 , w
∗
2) is an
stable equilibrium; else if w∗1 , w
∗
2 > max
{
2(c−a)
c−b ,
2(d−b)
c−b
}
, then (0, 0, w∗1 , w
∗
2) is
an stable equilibrium.
For the second type of equilibrium, take c > a > d > b into consideration, we
found that the conditions are in conflict with each other, which means there is no such
type of equilibriums under Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.
Intuitively, for a PD game, from Corollary 1, we know that if both SA-IGA play-
ers are initially sufficiently social-friendly (the value of w is large than a certain
threshold), then they will always converge to mutual cooperation of (C,C). In other
words, given that the value of w exceeds certain threshold, the strategy point of (1, 1)
(or (C,C)) in the strategy space is asymptotically stable. If both players start with a
low socially-aware degree (w is smaller than certain threshold), then they will always
converge to mutual defection of (D,D) eventually. For the rest of cases, there exist
infinite number of equilibrium points in-between the above two extreme cases, all of
which are not stable, which means that the learning dynamic will never converge to
those equilibrium points.
Next we turn to analyze the dynamics of SA-IGA playing the Symmetric Coordi-
nation game. The general form of a Coordination game is shown in Table 3. From the
table, we can see that the Coordination game is asymmetric if any of the following
conditions are met: R 6= r, P 6= p, T 6= t or S 6= s. we analyze a simplified game
first, i.e., the Symmetric Coordination game, the general circumstance of coordina-
tion game will be analyzed later. Similar to the analysis of Theorem 1, we have,
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
1 2
Agent 1’s
actions
1 R/r S/t
2 T/s P/p
Table 3 The General Form of a Coordination Game (where R > T ∧ P > S and r > t ∧ p > s)
Corollary 2 The dynamics of SA-IGA algorithm under a symmetric coordination
game have two types of stable equilibrium points:
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1. (1, 1, w∗1, w
∗
2), with
T−S
2 w
∗
1 > T −R;
2. (0, 0, w∗1, w
∗
2), with
T−S
2 w
∗
i < P − S;
where u = R+ P − S − T .
Proof : The proof is the same with Theorem 1, thus we omit it here.
Intuitively, for a Symmetric Coordination game, from Corollary 2, there are two
types of stable equilibrium if players playing SA-IGA policy, which means players
will eventually converging to action (1, 1) or (0, 0), i.e., the Nash equilibriums of
the Symmetric Coordination game. Besides, because the final convergence of the
algorithm depends on the combined effect of p and w, we cannot give a theoretical
conclusion about the condition under which the algorithm will converge to the social
optimal for a symmetric Coordination game. In fact, experimental simulations in the
following section show that the SA-IGA has a higher probability converging to social
optimal.
Now we turn to consider the asymmetric case. As we mentioned before, SA-IGA
under an asymmetric game may have nonlinear dynamics when u1 6= u2, which has
caused great difficulties for theoretical analysis. For this reason, we only analyze the
general Coordination game which is a typical asymmetric game.
Theorem 4 The dynamics of SA-IGA algorithm under a general coordination game
have three types of equilibrium points:
1. (0, 0, w∗1, w
∗
2), with w
∗
1 = 1 ∧ w
∗
2 = 0 when P > p > t; w
∗
1 = 0 ∧ w
∗
2 = 1 when
T < P < p; and
(
t−S
2 w
∗
1 < P − S
)
∧
(
T−s
2 w
∗
2 < p− s
)
when P = p;
2. (1, 1, w∗1, w
∗
2), with w
∗
1 = 1 ∧ w
∗
2 = 0 when R > r > s; w
∗
1 = 0 ∧ w
∗
2 = 1 when
T < R < r; and
(
T−s
2 w
∗
1 < R− T
)
∧
(
S−t
2 w
∗
2 < r − t
)
when R = r;
3. (p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 , w
∗
2), others.
The first and second types of equilibrium points are stable, while the last non-
boundary equilibrium points is not.
Proof : Following the system of differential equations in Equations (11), we can ex-
press the dynamics of SA-IGA in coordination game as follows:
p˙1 =
(
u1 +
u2 − u1
2
w1
)
p2 +
d2 − c1
2
w1 + c1
p˙2 =
(
u2 +
u1 − u2
2
w2
)
p1 +
d1 − c2
2
w2 + c2
w˙1 = ε · [(u1 − u2) p1p1 + (c1 − c2) p1 + (d2 − d1) p2 + e1]
w˙2 = −w˙1
(13)
where ε = ηw
ηp
> 0,u1 = R+P − S − T > 0, u2 = r+ p− s− t > 0, c1 = S −P ,
c2 = s− p, d1 = T − P , d2 = t− p, and e1 = P − p. We can see that the dynamic
of coordination game is nonlinear when u1 6= u2. We start with proving the last type
of equilibrium points first:
If there exit a equilibrium eq = (p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
T ∈ (0, 1)4, then there have
p˙i (eq) = 0 and w˙i (eq) = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. By linearizing the unconstrained update
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differential equations into the form of x˙ = Ax +B in point eq = (p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
T
,
we have
A =


0 u∗1 a13 0
u∗2 0 0 a24
−εa13 εa24 0 0
εa13 −εa24 0 0


where u∗1 = u1 +
u2−u1
2 w
∗
1 and u
∗
2 = u2 +
u1−u2
2 w
∗
2 , The parameters aij are
represented as functions of p∗1, p
∗
2, w
∗
1 andw
∗
2 . Without loss of generality, we set u1 ≥
u2. Because of u1 ≥ u2 > 0, and w
∗
1 , w
∗
2 ∈ [0, 1], we have u
∗
1 ∈ [
u1+u2
2 ,u1] and
u∗2 ∈ [u2,
u1+u2
2 ], which means u
∗
1 > u
∗
2 > 0.
After calculatingmatrixA’s eigenvalue in Matlab, we have an eigenvalueλ1 = 0,
an eigenvalue λ2 with its real part Re (λ2) > 0, an eigenvalue λ3 with Re (λ3) < 0
and an eigenvalue λ4 close to 0. Since there exists an eigenvalue λ > 0, the equilib-
rium eq is not stable [21].
Next we turn to prove the first type of equilibrium. In this case, we need to put the
projection function back since we are dealing with boundary cases.
For the case P > p > t, we have V idvi (eq) > V
soc
i (eq), thus w˙r (eq) > 0
and w˙2 (eq) < 0, which means w1 and w2 will keep w1 = 1 and w2 = 0. Because
p˙1 (eq) =
t−p+S−P
2 < 0 and p˙2 (eq) = s − p < 0, then pr and pc will keep
pr = 0 and pc = 0. According to the continuity theorem of differential equations
[11], (0, 0, 1, 0) is a stable equilibrium. The case p > P > T can be proved similarly,
which is omitted here.
For the case P = p, we have V idvi = V
soc
i , then w˙1 (eq) = −w˙2 (eq) =
ε
(
V idv1 − V
soc
i
)
= 0. Because
(
T−s
2 w
∗
2 < p− s
)
, we have p˙1 =
T−s
2 w
∗
2+s−p < 0.
Because
(
t−S
2 w
∗
1 < P − S
)
, we have p˙2 =
t−S
2 w
∗
2 + S − P < 0. According to the
continuity theorem of differential equations, (0, 0, w∗1, w
∗
2) is a stable equilibrium.
The stability of the second type of equilibrium points can be proved similarly, which
is omitted here.
From Theorem 4, we find that conclusions of Corollary 2 is a special case of The-
orem 4. Note that it can be verified by drawn the symmetry conditions into Theorem
4.
5 A Practical Algorithm
In SA-IGA, each agent needs to know the policy of others and the payoff function,
which are usually not available before a repeated game starts. Based on the idea of
SA-IGA, we relax the above assumptions and propose a practical multiagent learning
algorithm called Socially-Aware Policy Gradient Ascent (SA-PGA). The overall flow
of SA-PGA is shown in Algorithm 2. In SA-PGA, each agent only needs to observe
the payoffs of both agents by the end of each round.
In SA-IGA, we know that agent i’s policy (the probability of selecting each ac-
tion) is updated based on the partial derivative of the expected value Vi, while the
social attitude w is adjusted according to the relative value of V idvi and V
soc
i . Here
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Algorithm 2 SA-PGA for player i
1: Let αpi ,αw ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) be learning rates.
2: Initialize,
Qidvi (a)← 0,Q
soc
i (a)← 0, Qi (a)← 0,
pii(a)←
1
|Ai|
, wi ← w0.
3: repeat
4: Same as PHC in Step 4 of Table 1.
5: Observing reward r and the average of all agents’ current rewards rall,
Qidvi (a)← (1− β)Q
idv
i (a) + βr,
Qsoci (a)← (1− β)Q
soc
i (a) + βrall,
Qi (a)← (1− wi)Qidvi (a) + wiQ
soc
i (a).
6: Update pii according to gradient ascent strategy, Same as PHC in Step 6 of Table 1.
7: Update wi,
V idvi =
∑
a∈Ai
pii(a)Qidvi (a) .
V soci =
∑
a∈Ai
pii(a)Qsoci (a) .
wi ← Π[0,1][wi + αw
(
V idvi − V
soc
i
)
] .
8: until the repeated game ends
in SA-PGA, we first estimate the value of V idvi and V
soc
i using Q-values, which
are updated based on the immediate payoffs received during repeated interactions.
Specifically, each agent i keeps a record of the Q-value of each action for both its
own and the average of all agents (Qidvi and Q
soc
i ) (Step 5). Both Q-values are up-
dated following Q-learning update rules accordingly by the end of each round (Step
5). Then the overall Q-value of each agent is calculated as the weighted average of
Qidvi and Q
soc
i weighted by its social attitude w (Step 5). The policy update strategy
is the same as the Table 1 in Step 6. Finally, the social attitude of agent i is updated
in Step 7. The value of V idvi and V
soc
i are estimated based on its current policy and
Q-values. The updating direction of wi is estimated as the difference between V
idv
i
and V soci . Note that a SA-PGA player in each interaction needs only to know its own
reward and the average reward of all agents. Knowing the average reward of a group
is a reasonable assumption in many realistic scenarios, such as elections and voting.
6 Experimental Evaluation
This section is divided into three parts. Subsection 6.1 compare SA-IGA and SA-
PGAwith simulation in different types of two-agents, two-actions, general-sumgames.
Subsection 6.2 presents the experimental results for the 2x2 benchmark games, specif-
ically, performance of converging to the social optimal outcomes and against self-
ish agents. Subsection 6.3 presents the experimental results for games with multiple
agents, i.e. public good game [3].
6.1 Simulation comparison of SA-IGA and SA-PGA
We start the performance evaluation with analyzing the learning performance of SA-
PGA under two-player two-action repeated games. In general a two-player two-action
game can be classified into three categories [24]:
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1. ∃i ∈ {1, 2}, (r11i − r
21
i )(r
12
i − r
22
i ) > 0. In this case, each player has a dominant
strategy and thus the game only has one pure strategy NE.
2. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (r11i − r
21
i )(r
12
i − r
22
i ) < 0 and (r
11
1 − r
21
1 )(r
21
2 − r
22
2 ) > 0. In this
case, there are two pure strategy NEs and one mixed strategy NE.
3. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (r11i − r
21
i )(r
12
i − r
22
i ) < 0 and (r
11
1 − r
21
1 )(r
21
2 − r
22
2 ) < 0. In this
case, there only exists one one mixed strategy NE.
where r
jk
i is the payoff of player i when player i takes action j while its opponent−i
takes action k. We select one representative game for each category for illustration.
6.1.1 Category 1
For category 1, we consider the PD game as shown in Table 1. In this game, both
players have one dominant strategyD, and (D,D) is the only pure strategy NE, while
there also exists one socially optimal outcome (C,C) under which both players can
obtain higher payoffs.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p1
p2
(a) SA-PGA in PD game
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p1
p2
(b) SA-IGA in PD game
Fig. 1 The Learning Dynamics of SA-IGA and SA-PGA in PD game ( w1(0) = w2(0) = 0.85, αpi =
αw = 0.001, β = 0.8)
Figure 1(a) show the learning dynamics of the practical SA-PGA algorithm play-
ing the PD game. The x-axis p1 represents player 1’s probability of playing action C
and the y-axis p2 represents player 2’s probability of playing action C. We randomly
selected 20 initial policy points as the starting point for the SA-PGA agents. We can
observe that the SA-PGA agents are able to converge to the mutual cooperation equi-
librium point starting from different initial policies.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the learning dynamics predicted by the theoretical SA-IGA
approach. Similar to the setting in Figure 1(a), the same set of initial policy points
are selected and we plot all the learning curves accordingly. We can see that for
each starting policy point, the learning dynamics predicted from the theoretical SA-
IGA is well consistent with the learning curves from simulation. This indicates that
we can better understand and predict the dynamics of SA-PGA algorithm using its
corresponding theoretical SA-IGA model.
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6.1.2 Category 2
For category 2, we consider the CG game as shown in Table 4. In this game, there
exist two pure strategy Nash equilibria (C, C) and (D, D), and both of them are also
socially optimal.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
C D
Agent 1’s
actions
C 3/4 0/0
D 0/0 4/3
Table 4 Coordination game (Category 2)
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(a) SA-PGA in CG
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(b) SA-IGA in CG
Fig. 2 The Learning Dynamics of SA-IGA and SA-PGA in coordination game (w1(0) = w2(0) = 0.85,
αpi = αw = 0.001, β = 0.8)
Figure 2(a) illustrates the learning dynamics of the practical SA-PGA algorithm
playing a CG game. The x-axis p1 represents player 1’s probability of playing action
C and the y-axis p2 represents player 2’s probability of playing action C. Similar to
the case of PD game, 20 initial policy points are randomly selected as the starting
points. We can see that the SA-PGA agents can converge to either of the aforemen-
tioned two equilibrium points depending on the initial policies they start with.
Figure 2(b) shows the learning dynamics predicted by the theoretical SA-IGA ap-
proach. Similar to the setting in Figure 2(a), we adopt the same set of 20 initial policy
points for comparison purpose. All the learning curves starting from these 20 pol-
icy points are drawn accordingly. We can observe that for each starting policy point,
the learning dynamics predicted from the theoretical SA-IGA is well consistent with
the learning curves obtained from simulation. Therefore, the theoretical model can
facilitate better understanding and predicting the dynamics of SA-PGA algorithm.
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6.1.3 Category 3
The gamewe use in Category 3 is shown in Table 5. In this game, there only exists one
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, while the pure strategy outcome (C,D) is socially
optimal.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
C D
Agent 1’s
actions
C 3/2 4/4
D 1/3 5/1
Table 5 An example game of Category 3
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(a) SA-PGA for the game with one mix NE
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(b) SA-IGA for the game with one mix NE
Fig. 3 The Learning Dynamics of SA-IGA and SA-PGA in game with one mix NE ( w1(0) = w2(0) =
0.85, αpi = αw = 0.001, β = 0.8)
Figure 3(a) illustrates the learning dynamics of the practical SA-PGA algorithm
playing the game in Table 5. The x-axis p1 and y-axis p2 represent player 1’s proba-
bility of playing action C and player 2’s probability of playing action C respectively.
Similar to the previous cases, 20 initial policy points are randomly selected as the
starting points. From Figure 3(a), we can see that the SA-PGA agents can always
converge to the socially optimal outcome (C,D) no matter where the initial policies
start with.
Figure 3(b) presents the learning dynamics of agents predicted by the theoretical
SA-IGA approach. Similar to the setting in Figure 3(a), we adopt the same set of 20
initial policy points for comparison purpose, and the corresponding learning curves
are drawn accordingly. From Figure 3(b), we can observe that for each starting pol-
icy point, the theoretical SA-IGA model can well predict the simulation results of
SA-PGA algorithm. Therefore, better understanding and insights of the dynamics of
SA-PGA algorithm can be obtained through analyzing its corresponding theoretical
model.
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6.2 Performance in 2× 2 General-sum Games
In this subsection we turn to evaluate the performance of SA-PGA in two-agents, two-
actions, general-sum games. First we implement two previous representative learning
algorithms for comparison: CJAL [5] and WoLF-PHC [8]. We compare their perfor-
mance based on the following two criteria: utilitarian social welfare and Nash social
welfare, which reflect the system-level efficiency of different learning strategies in
terms of the total payoffs received for the agents. Then we evaluate the ability of
SA-PGA against selfish opponents with the same three representative games used in
previous sections.
6.2.1 Comparison of SA-PGA with CJAL and WoLF-PHC
we evaluate the performance of SA-PGA with CJAL [5] and WoLF-PHC [8] in
two-player’s repeated games under self-play. CJAL is selected since this algorithm
is specifically designed to enable agents to achieve mutual cooperation (i.e., maxi-
mizing social welfare) instead of inefficient NE for games like prisoner’s dilemma.
WoLF-PHC is selected as one representativeNE-oriented algorithm for baseline com-
parison purpose. For all previous strategies the same parameter settings used in their
original papers are adopted.
Utilitarian Social Welfare Nash Product
SA-PGA (our strategy)
(wr(0) = wc(0) = 0.85)
7.241 ± 0.003 12.706 ± 0.015
CJAL [5] 6.504 ± 0.032 10.887 ± 0.114
WoLF-IGA [8] 6.536 ± 0.004 10.943 ± 0.145
Table 6 Performance comparison with CJAL and WoLF-PHC
We use all possible structurally distinct two-player, two-action conflict games as
a testbed for SA-PGA. In each game, each player ranks the four possible outcomes
from 1 to 4. We use the rank of an outcome as the payoff to that player for any out-
come. We perform the evaluation under 100 randomly generated games with strict
ordinal payoffs. We perform 10,000 interactions for each run and the results are av-
eraged over 20 runs for each game.
We compare their performance based on the the following two criteria: utilitarian
social welfare (USW) andNash social welfare (NSW). Utilitarian social welfare is the
sum of the payoffs obtained by the two players in their converged state, while Nash
social welfare is the product of the payoffs obtained by two players in their converged
state. Formally, USW =V1+V2 and NSW = V1V2, where V1 and V2 are payoffs
obtained by the two players in their converged state, averaged over 100 randomly
generated games. Both criteria reflect the system-level efficiency of different learning
strategies in terms of the total payoffs received for the agents. Besides, Nash social
welfare also partially reflects the fairness in terms of how equal the agents’ payoffs
are. The overall comparison results are summarized in Table 6. We can see that SA-
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PGA outperforms the previous CJAL strategy and WoLF-PHC strategy under both
criteria.
6.2.2 Performance Against Selfish Agents
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Fig. 4 SA-PGA against a selfish agent for in PD game(wr(0) = 1, pr(0) = 0.2 and pc(0) = 0.8)
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Fig. 5 SA-PGA against a selfish agent for in coordination game(wr(0) = 1, pr(0) = 0.2 and pc(0) =
0.8)
If a learning agent is facing selfish agents that attempt to exploit others, one rea-
sonable choice for an effective algorithm is to learn a Nash equilibrium. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate the ability of SA-PGA against selfish opponents.We adopt the same
three representative games used in previous sections as the testbed and the results are
given in Figure 4, 5 and 6 respectively. We can observe that for the PD and coor-
dination games, the SA-PGA agent can successfully achieve the corresponding NE
solution. This property is desirable since it prevents the SA-PGA agent from being
taken advantage by selfish opponents. The results also show how the socially-aware
degree w of SA-PGA agent changes, which varies depending on the game struc-
ture. For PD and coordination game, a SA-PGA agent eventually behaves as a purely
individually rational entity and one pure strategy NE is eventually converged to. In
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Fig. 6 SA-PGA against a selfish agent for the game with only one mix NE(wr(0) = 1, pr(0) = 0.2 and
pc(0) = 0.8)
contrast, for the third type of game (Table 5), a SA-PGA agent behaves as a purely so-
cially rational agent and cooperate with the selfish agent towards the socially optimal
outcome (C,D) without fully exploiting the opponent. This indicates the cleverness
of SA-PGA since higher individual payoff can be achieved under the outcome (C, D)
than pursuing Nash equilibrium (C,C).
6.3 Performance in games with multiple agents
We use Public Goods Game (PGG) [3] to further evaluate the performance of SA-
PGA in multiple agent cases. PGG is an extended version of the PD game in mul-
tiagent environment, which has attracted increasing attention to study cooperative
behavior and, in particular, deviations from the rational equilibrium [22,28]. In a typ-
ical public goods experiment a group of players is endowed with one dollar each. The
players then have the opportunity to invest their money into a common pool, knowing
that the total amount will be doubled and split equally among all players, irrespective
of their contributions. If everybody invests their money, they end up with two dollars.
However, each player faces the temptation to free-ride on others’ contributions by
withholding the money because each invested dollar yields only a return of 50 cents.
If everybody adopts this rational strategy, no one would increase the initial capital
and forego the public good. The payoffs for cooperators RC and defectors RD in a
group of N interacting individuals are then given by,
RD =
rNCc
N
,RC = RD − c
where r denotes the multiplication factor of the public good, NC the number of
cooperators in the group and c the cost of the cooperative contributions, i.e. each
agent’s investment in the public good. From the definition, the defect action, i.e.,
the action of not contributing to the public, is the dominate strategy because RD >
RC . The Nash equilibrium of all PGG players is that everyone chooses to defect,
while the social optimal outcomes strategy of PGG is that everyone contributes the
the public. We evaluate the performance of SA-PGA in PGG repeated games with
three players under three circumstance: 1) games with three SA-PGA players, and
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2) games with two SA-PGA player and one selfish opponent, and 3) games with one
SA-PGA player and two selfish opponents. Without lose of generality, all players’
initial policies p(0) of each game are settled to 0.5. Other parameters such as r and c
in the three experiments are exactly the same, r = 2, c = 2.
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Fig. 7 The Learning Dynamics of SA-PGA in PGG with three SA-PGA players (αpi = αw = 0.001,
β = 0.8, pi(0) = 0.5 and wi(0) = 0.85)
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Fig. 8 The Learning Dynamics of SA-PGA in PGG with two SA-PGA players and one selfish opponents
(αpi = αw = 0.001, β = 0.8, pi(0) = 0.5 and w1(0) = w2(0) = 0.85)
Figure 7 shows the learning dynamics of PGG games with three SA-PGA players.
The y-axis p represents the probability of playing action C, i.e. the cooperate action,
while the x-axis t is the timeline. Each line in Figure 7 shows the learning dynamic
of one player’s strategy.We can observe that the SA-PGA agents are able to converge
to the mutual cooperation equilibrium point giving the initial value of w(0) large
enough (here we set w = 0.85).
Figure 8 shows the learning dynamics of PGG games with two SA-PGA players
and one selfish opponent, while Figure 9 shows the learning dynamics of PGG games
with one SA-PGA player and two selfish opponents. The y-axis p&w represents the
probability of strategy p and the socially-aware degreew. The solid lines are learning
dynamics of players’ strategies, and dotted lines are learning dynamics of SA-PGA
players’ socially-aware degrees. From Figure 8 and 9, we can observe that agents
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Fig. 9 The Learning Dynamics of SA-PGA in PGG with one SA-PGA players and two selfish opponents
(αpi = αw = 0.001, β = 0.8, pi(0) = 0.5 and w1(0) = 0.85)
initially tends to cooperate with others and later realizes that the other agents are not
cooperating, thus converging to the pure strategy D eventually behaves as a purely
individually rational entity. This property is desirable since it prevents the SA-PGA
agent from being taken advantage by selfish opponents.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel way of incorporating social awareness into tra-
ditional gradient-ascent algorithm to facilitate reaching mutually beneficial solutions
(e.g., (C, C) in PD game). We first present a theoretical gradient-ascent based policy
updating approach (SA-IGA) and analyzed its learning dynamics using dynamical
system theory. For PD games, we show that mutual cooperation (C,C) is stable equi-
librium point as long as both agents are strongly socially-aware. For Coordination
games, either of the Nash equilibria (C,C) and (D,D) can be a stable equilibrium point
depending on the agents’ socially-aware degrees. Following that, we proposed a prac-
tical learning algorithm SA-PGA relaxing the impractical assumptions of SA-IGA.
Experimental results show that a SA-PGA agent can achieve higher social welfare
than previous algorithms under self-play and also is robust against individually ra-
tional opponents. As future work, more testbed scenarios (e.g., population of agents)
will be applied to further evaluate the performance of SA-PGA. Another interesting
direction is to investigate how to further improve the convergence rate of SA-PGA.
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